Incertidumbre Lógica: Pluralismo Lógico y Consecuencia Lógica
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.29105/aitas2.3-32Mots-clés :
Uncertainty, Logic, Consequence, PluralismRésumé
It is traditionally thought that logic leaves no room for uncertainty. The validity of arguments and whether a statement is a logical truth or not are typically not issues that invite reasons for doubt. In this paper, I argue that, despite its widespread acceptance, this view is difficult to maintain. I offer two main reasons for this conclusion: (a) In light of the plurality of logics, there are significant disagreements about the validity of arguments. (b) It is similarly difficult to reconcile the view that logic is certain with considerations to the effect that logical consequence, arguably the central concept of logic, cannot be analyzed. The very nature of logical consequence is, thus, open for doubt. After giving some illustrations in support of (a), I discuss a dilemma for the adequacy of any conceptual analysis of logical consequence, in support of (b), and respond to some possible objections. In the end, logic is what it is independently of any certainty. I close with some reflections as to why this is not a bad outcome.
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© Octávio Bueno 2022
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